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There is no shortage of opinion among members of the legal academy on the 
Supreme Court’s decade-long campaign to strengthen and enforce constitutional limits on 
the power of the federal government.  Generally speaking, the most vocal critics of the 
Court’s path tend to be politically liberal, while conservatives by and large applaud recent 
decisions.  This is something of a role reversal for the two groups.  From the 1960s 
through the 1990s, conservatives were the ones calling for “strict construction,” “judicial 
restraint,” and even for limits on the power of judicial review.1  Now Mark Tushnet 
argues for “Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts”2 and Larry Kramer suggests 
that the modern Court’s judicial review is more aggressive than that power articulated by 
Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison.3  The vigor with which the Court has 
struck down acts of Congress in recent years has spawned more than one symposium on 
“conservative” judicial activism.4
What makes the book under review so interesting is that the critique of the 
Court’s jurisprudence is made by a conservative: John Noonan, a former law professor, 
now judge on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.  Polemical in tone,  Judge Noonan’s 
book attacks the Court for issuing rulings that have “narrowed the nation’s power” and 
usurped national legislative prerogatives.  He argues strenuously that much harm has 
been done by the Court’s decisions, and that more harm is likely.  I summarize and assess 
Noonan’s critique in this essay.
I.
*
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1 See, e.g., Robert BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990); ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARD 
GOMORRAH (1996); CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: FROM 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW (1986); see also LOUIS LUSKY, BY WHAT 
RIGHT?: A COMMENTARY ON THE SUPREME COURT’S RIGHT TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION (1975); 
WILLIAM J. QUIRK & R. RANDALL BRIDWELL, JUDICIAL DICTATORSHIP (1995).
2 MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
3 See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Foreword, We the Court, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 10-16 (2001) (summarizing the argument).
4 See, e.g., Symposium, Conservative Judicial Activism, 73 COLO. L. REV. 1139 (2002); see also Cass 
Sunstein, A Hand in the Matter, LEGAL AFF. (March/April 2003), at 27 (criticizing Rehnquist Court’s 
“conservative judicial activism”) and Orrin S. Kerr, Upholding the Law, LEGAL AFF. (March/April 2003), 
at 31 (disputing Sunstein’s characterization of the Rehnquist Court as activist).
2John T. Noonan, Jr. is a well-respected federal judge and former law professor, 
whose book received considerable attention when it was published.  Before the 
Republicans retook control of the House and Senate following the 2002 elections, his 
book was even the subject of hearings held by the Senate Judiciary Committee.  That a 
sitting federal judge—and one considered conservative at that—would criticize the 
direction in which the Court was headed make his views particularly worthy of 
consideration.
Noonan’s argument, in a nutshell, is this.  In 1997, the Supreme Court handed 
down Boerne v. Flores,5 which struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
passed by Congress under its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.6  In doing so, 
the Court articulated a standard by which future exercises of that power were to be 
measured.  Boerne required Congress to demonstrate that remedial measures undertaken 
to prevent state abridgement of constitutional rights needed to demonstrate both 
congruence in terms of the level of rights violations occurring in the states, as well as 
proportionality in its remedial response.7  The decision was unanimous, and no member 
of the Court expressed dissatisfaction with this congruence and proportionality criteria.8
Noonan, however, argues that by doing so, the Court laid the foundation for judicial 
usurpation of legislative prerogatives by requiring Congress to satisfy this heightened 
standard when enacting civil rights laws.  The Court compounded its error, in Noonan’s 
view, when it simultaneously began to expand the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
insulating nonconsenting states from private lawsuits, despite lacking a textual, historical, 
or structural basis for either the doctrine or its expansion.  Thus, the Court privileged the 
preservation of state sovereignty over notions of federal supremacy.  The synergy 
between Boerne, on the one hand, and the sovereign immunity cases on the other, argues 
Noonan, has produced a dramatic scaling back of remedies available to those whose 
statutory rights have been violated by state actors, and an inability of Congress (because 
of Boerne’s heightened requirements) to do much to secure those rights.  The end result, 
argues Noonan, is a “narrowing of the nation’s power” to secure the ends for which the 
Constitution was established, as declared in the Preamble.
Noonan lays out his argument in a series of Socratic dialogues and vignettes 
describing the cases in which the Court has developed these doctrines, devoting particular 
attention to the plight of the litigants themselves.  Along the way, he invites comparisons 
between the present Court and past Courts that produce Dred Scott and Lochner; charges 
the Supreme Court and the lower court judges that have implemented the Court’s 
decisions with callous insensitivity to plaintiffs coming to court seeking redress for 
violation of their rights; and criticizes the Court’s attempts to place limits on Congress’s 
commerce power.
A.
5
   521 U.S. 507 (1997).
6 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
7 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533-34. 
8
   Three justices dissented over the Court’s unwillingness to revisit the decision in Smith.  See id. at 544 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting); id at 565 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 566 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
3Boerne v. Flores lays at the heart of Noonan’s argument, and he begins his book 
there.  In 1993 Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act9 in an effort to 
correct what it saw as a retreat by the Supreme Court in the protection of the First 
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.  In 1990, the Court held that generally-applicable 
laws not specifically aimed at religious exercise or at a particular religious group did not 
violate the Free Exercise Clause.10  Such laws were valid as long as they satisfied the 
lesser standard of “rational basis” (pp. 23-25).  The decision was surprising, writes 
Noonan, because the Court “did so without asking the litigants to brief the issue that the 
Court found dispositive” (p.24).  The decision represented, for Noonan, a surprising 
reversal for the Court after having emerged in the post-war era as an aggressive guarantor 
of religious liberty (pp.15-23).
RFRA was passed by Congress as a reaction to the Smith case; its passage was 
grounded in Congress’s power, under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to enforce 
the guarantees of that Amendment (pp.25-27).  RFRA required all state and local laws 
that affected free exercise rights to demonstrate that they served a “compelling 
governmental interest” and were “narrowly tailored” to that interest.11  “Not before 
RFRA had Congress exercised as to religious liberty the power to enforce conferred upon 
it by section 5,” Noonan writes.  When it “used the power the constitution gave it and, 
doing so, explicitly rebuked the Supreme Court,” the question was whether the Court 
“would . . . accept the rebuke” (p.27)?
According to Judge Noonan, Congress may have had reason to be optimistic.  He 
recounts the history of the Fourteenth Amendment’s framing, pointing out that Congress, 
not the Court, was given power to enforce the provisions of the Amendment.  In addition, 
the Court had previously upheld congressional action to prevent discrimination against 
Spanish-speaking voters, though the Court had held that action did not violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment (pp. 28-31).12
The Court did not accept Congress’s rebuke.  In a unanimous decision concerning 
a church’s conflict with a local zoning board over expansion plans, the Court struck down 
RFRA, holding that Congress had improperly exercised its section 5 power.13  In doing 
so, the Court formulated and applied what Noonan calls “unprecedented” requirements 
that remedies under section 5 be both proportional and congruent to the alleged violations 
Congress seeks to remedy (p.35).  “Who was measure the proportion,” Noonan asks, 
“[i]mplicitly, the answer was ‘the court.’  What measure would the court use?  Implicitly, 
the answer was ‘whatever we find handy’” (p.35).  Requiring such proof, Noonan argues, 
had the effect of treating a coequal branch of government no better than an executive 
agency “whose work will be set aside on appeal if the court finds the record made by the 
agency not substantial enough to justify the agency’s rulings” (p.6). He finds it ironic 
that while the Court can establish render a constitutional decision, binding on all, in a 
9
   42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
10 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
11
   42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
12 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
13 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
4single case, Congress is required to doing something similar without demonstrating it 
acted on the basis of an adequate record (p. 37).  Boerne represents, for Noonan, nothing 
less than a bid by the Court for judicial supremacy (pp. 39-40).
B.
The implications of Boerne would only become apparent after the Court expanded 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity by continuing to narrow the instances in which a 
private citizen could successfully sue a non-consenting state.14  After 1996’s Seminole 
Tribe case concluded that Congress could not abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity 
through the exercise of its commerce power,15 only the Fourteenth Amendment’s section 
5 remained as a source of federal power to waive a state’s sovereign immunity.16  But, as 
Noonan details in the bulk of his work, the Court made clear that its proportionality and 
congruence criteria in Boerne were the measure for congressional action that waived 
states’ sovereign immunity under section 5 as well.17  Noonan devotes over half his book 
(4 chapters) to this intersection between Boerne and the sovereign immunity doctrine, 
and to an examination of the doctrine itself.
Chapters 2 and 3 are written as Socratic dialogues among “Judge Samuel Simple” 
his law clerks, an old law partner, and some graduate school colleagues, which explore 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  More to the point, the chapters represent Noonan’s 
argument that sovereign immunity is a legal fiction with no support in the text, history, 
and structure of the Constitution, but is a product of “mere” judicial doctrine—a doctrine, 
moreover, beset with so many contradictions that it barely deserves to be called a legal 
principle (p.10).
Judge Simple’s conversation with his clerks (“Yalewoman,” “Boaltman,” and 
“Harvardman”) illustrates the contours of the doctrine, its exceptions, and possible 
justifications for sovereign immunity’s existence.   A clerk summarizes the doctrine:
An unconsenting state . . . cannot be sued in federal court or in state court except 
by the federal government itself.  It cannot be sued even though Congress in the 
exercise of the powers conferred on it in article I has given individuals the right to 
sue.  Its immunity from private suits is, as the court has expressed it, “central to 
the sovereign dignity” (p.42).
The Judge and his clerks then discuss the various exceptions to this general rule.  Federal 
courts can entertain habeas corpus petitions, and suits against state officials who, though 
14 See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.10 (2nd ed. 2002); 1 LAURENCE H. 
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3.25 (3rd ed. 2000).
15
   Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996).
16 See id. at 65; Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976).
17 See Federal Maritime Comm’n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864 (2002) (sovereign 
immunity bars federal agency adjudication of dispute between private citizen and nonconsenting state); 
Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (legislative record insufficient to support congressional 
abrogation of state sovereign immunity under Fourteenth Amendment in Americans with Disabilities Act); 
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (same, under Age Discrimination Act); Alden v. 
Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding Congress may not subject nonconsenting states to suit in state court); 
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); 
College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
5acting in the name of the state and thus state-actors, are deemed not to be the state for 
sovereign immunity purposes (pp. 43-48).18  The ability of Congress to waive states’ 
sovereign immunity under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is also discussed (pp. 
48-49), as is the power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of a state high court on 
appeal (p. 49).  In addition, the groups discusses the fact that cities, but not states, are 
“persons” under § 1983 actions, and thus are not extended sovereign immunity (p. 51).
The discussion then turns to the reasons given by the Court for its protection of 
sovereign immunity.  “Protection of the dignity of the state” is presented as the only real 
reason offered by the Court in defense of its aggressive enforcement, leading 
Harvardman to complain of the “rather abstract character” of the Court’s reasoning that 
“being sued without consent impairs the dignity of the state” (p. 52).  The participants 
note that when the state is suable under one of the exceptions that it loses this dignity (p. 
54).  Another reason—shielding the financial integrity of the states—is briefly 
mentioned, and Noonan returns to that in the next chapter.
Noonan has Yalewoman sum up what is troubling about the Court’s insistence 
that sovereign immunity is a structural principle that deserves judicial enforcement.  She 
complains that the structural reasoning used by the Court is too mutable: “If you don’t 
have a stable text, what do you have?  Anybody can guess at the background, the hidden 
postulates, the presuppositions of a text” (p. 57).  Another clerk wonders whether “the 
court’s history”—which presumes that sovereign immunity was intended by the 
Framers—“like its logic, is screwed up” (p. 57).
The Court’s fidelity to history is the question that Judge Simple sets off to discuss 
with old graduate school friends.  Before their discussion, however, the Judge sounds out 
his old law partner on the relationship between sovereign immunity and state financial 
protection.  His partner assures him that there is very little relationship; that sovereign 
immunity does not, for example, affect the market for state bonds (pp. 58-59).  The 
Judge’s partner suggests that the doctrine is so riddled with exceptions that it is 
susceptible to manipulation in favor of just about any result a judge would want to reach 
in a given case (p. 60).
Through the dialogue between Judge Simple and his grad school classmates, 
Noonan summarizes the history of sovereign immunity’s development.  The conversation 
attempts to track the evolution of an amendment that, at bottom Noonan argues, was a 
rule of interpretation for Article III power (p. 62) into an all-purpose state shield against 
civil rights suits.19
All the participants conclude that Chisholm v. Georgia,20 the case that spawned 
the 11th Amendment, proves that no member of the founding generation had “the idea of 
the modern justices that sovereign immunity was somehow built into the constitution” (p. 
18 Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
19
   For a summary of the competing interpretations of the 11th amendment, see Carlos Manuel Vazquez, 
What is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683, 1693 - 1708 (1997).
20
   2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 401 (1794).
666).  Moreover, they note “how little immunity stood in the way [of federal power vis-à-
vis the states] at a time when the states were relatively powerful in relation to the federal 
government” (p.70).  Having disposed of the originalist argument for sovereign 
immunity, Judge Noonan presses his argument that the doctrine is entirely judge-made.  
The key case from which the current Court has extended the reach of sovereign immunity 
is Hans v. Louisiana,21 in which the Court’s reasoning made “the eleventh amendment 
superfluous” by conceiving of sovereign immunity as a background principle (p. 74).  
Hans, Noonan argues, not the 11th amendment is the authority for the Court’s aggressive 
expansion of immunity: “Hans  is an icon for the modern court. . . . The modern court 
needs Hans as a reference point, a precedent, a reassurance,” one character says (p. 75).  
To speak of “eleventh amendment immunity” allows the Court “a rhetorical boost.  The 
court seems to be citing the construction when all the court actually has to conjure with is 
its own judicially created immunity for the states” (p. 73).
Naturally, Judge Simple’s grad school classmates have little good to say for Hans
itself.  In addition to suggestions that Justice Bradley’s opinion represented “law-office” 
history (pp. 80), and suggestions that Bradley might as well have been interpreting and 
applying the Constitution of the Confederate States of America (pp. 84-85), Noonan has 
his interlocutors offer up a conspiracy theory—Hans was a sop to the South, a bid for 
reconciliation at a time when Reconstruction was winding down (p. 79).  “There’s just 
nothing to support the view that immunity was part of the constitutional design or 
inherent in its plan,” Judge Simple concludes (p. 85).  “Hans and the modern cases,” says 
another, “seem less a development of doctrine than a corruption of doctrine” (p. 84).  
“The chief practical effect,” the Judge continues, “is to shield not only state governments 
but many subsidiary state agencies from complying with federal laws enacted for the 
good of all.”
II.
For the last chapters of the book, Noonan leaves dialogue behind and offers an 
account of several of the Court’s recent sovereign immunity decisions: Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,22 Kimmel v. Florida 
Board of Regents,23 and Board of Trustees v. Garrett.24  In something of a departure from 
the main argument of the book, Noonan also takes on the Court’s decision in United 
States v. Morrison, which struck down a portion of the federal Violence Against Women 
Act.25  In each instance, Noonan pays particular attention to the facts and personalities, 
apparently to make the point that real people are affected by the Court’s decisions, and 
that the Court (and, by implication, lower courts applying the Court’s decisions) has too 
often neglected to take the impact of their decisions into account.26
In the chapter on Florida Prepaid, Noonan recounts how the State of Florida 
allegedly violated the patent of a man who allegedly invented the concept of prepaid 
21
   134 U.S. 1 (1890).
22
   527 U.S. 627 (1999).
23
   528 U.S. 62 (2000).
24
   121 S. Ct. 955 (2001).
25
   529 U.S. 598 (2000).
26 See infra notes __ - ___ and accompanying text.
7college savings accounts (pp. 86-91).  The Court found that Congress did not have 
enough evidence, under the standard articulated in Boerne, to abrogate states’ sovereign 
immunity and permit suits against nonconsenting states.27  He criticizes the conclusion: 
“Why should Congress have considered state remedies for such infringement when 
federal patent law preempted state law and prevented the states from offering remedies” 
(p. 93).  Moreover, he asks, “[w]as it reasonable to expect ‘widespread and persistent 
deprivation’ by the states of patent rights, when, since 1790, federal law had protected 
patentees” (p. 93)?  Only a “bold and lawless state . . . would have intentionally violated 
the patent law in force . . .” (p. 93).  While an injunction could still be obtained, Noonan 
argues the deprivation of a right to damages left patent-holders with “a mutilated kind of 
right to property” (p. 94).  He also chided the Court for concluding, in a companion 
case,28 that the state was immune from suit by the 11th amendment without considering 
that “the state was acting for profit and might be competing unfairly with private 
persons” (p. 96).  If the rationale for protecting sovereign immunity was, as the Court had 
said, protecting the dignity of the state, Noonan writes that rationale “seemed singularly 
ill-mated to . . . an insurance scheme” (p. 97).
In Kimel and Garrett, the Court held that Congress did not accumulate sufficient 
evidence to permit it to abrogate sovereign immunity under federal age discrimination 
and disability laws.29  “[O]nce again,” Judge Noonan notes, “Congress had failed the 
Boerne tests.  The evil[s] had not been established.  The legislative response[s were] 
disproportionate.  The states remained immune” (p. 107).  These decisions made clear 
that “the battle of Boerne had been but the opening encounter in . . . a continuing struggle 
between an innovative and entrenched [majority] committed to an agenda controlled by 
sovereign immunity and a minority, one vote short, attempting to defend positions once 
believed to be established” (p. 113).  In this embattled minority’s dissents, Noonan hears 
“[t]he spirit of John Marshall” speaking to remind the Court that it was not being 
sufficiently deferential to Congress and that its lack of deference “was ‘reminiscent’ of 
the discredited limitation that the court in the 1930s had put on Congress’s power over 
commerce” (p. 119).
Before summarizing his indictment of the Court, Noonan pauses to critique 
United States v. Morrison,30 in which the Court held that neither the Commerce Clause31
nor section 5 of the 14th amendment32 provided Congress with authority to permit 
individuals to file civil suits in federal court against persons for engaging in violence 
motivated by the victim’s gender (pp. 120-37).  Noonan’s critique of Morrison’s 
Commerce Clause analysis largely tracks that of the Morrison dissenting justices, who 
accuse the majority of flirting with Lochnerism in its disregard for congressional 
authority (p. 135).33  But “[n]o appeal to history, no sharp reminder of past follies,” he 
writes, “moved the majority.  The dissent consoled itself with the observation that not all 
27 Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 637-48.
28 College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 683-86.
29 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 85.
30
   529 U.S. 598 (2000).
31 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18.
32 Id. at 621.
33 Id. at 628 (Souter, J., dissenting).
8the cases affirming the extent of the commerce power were overruled.  The new doctrine 
was not firmly established. . . . The situation was unstable and could not last” (p. 135).34
The Court’s 14th amendment analysis in Morrison, he continues, “replayed the drama of 
the post-Reconstruction reaction, the court staying with the analysis that doomed the law 
against the Klansmen and the attempt to give civil rights beyond the vote to the 
emancipated people of color” (p. 137).
III.
Noonan’s final chapter summarizes his disenchantment with the Court’s direction 
and offers a few suggestions for Congress to counteract the effects of the Court’s 
decisions.  While not quite a counsel of despair, Noonan is certainly pessimistic, noting 
that “[a]s long as the members of the majority remain on the court and stick together . . . 
the court’s position [on sovereign immunity and remedial action under the Fourteenth 
Amendment] will be difficult to dislodge” (p. 140).  He raises, and dismisses, a couple of 
congressional remedies as either too uncertain (using the confirmation process), 
cumbersome (using the Article V amendment process), or “beneath the dignity of the 
national legislature” (using Congress’s budgetary power to harass the judges by limiting 
salary increases, cutting funds for clerks, etc.) (p. 141).  The best remedy, he writes, “is 
legislation drafted after careful study of the opinions of the Supreme Court establishing 
the constitutional criteria and, if possible, using powers not constrained by the Court,” 
like Congress’s conditional spending power (p. 141).
In the end, Noonan’s final chapter, though, seems directed not so much to 
Congress as it is to the Supreme Court itself.  “The sovereign remedy for ills in a 
democracy,” he writes, “is exploration and exposition of a problem, leaving it to the good 
sense of those who can affect its solution to take the necessary steps” (p. 143).  Since he’s 
all but admitted that Congress cannot do much to divert the Court from its present path, 
he must have a different audience—a judicial audience—in mind.
To that audience, Noonan addresses a series of questions.  “How did the court get 
itself in the awkward posture of monitoring Congress the way appellate courts monitor 
executive agencies” (p.148)?  Why should Congress be accorded only a remedial role in 
enforcing the 14th amendment when that amendment “assigns Congress the role of 
enforcing its guarantees” (p. 148)?  Why won’t the Court defer to legislative and 
executive interpretations of their constitutional duties (p.149)?  Why does the Court insist 
on enforcing a strong version of sovereign immunity when the concept does not play a 
prominent role in the text or structure of the Constitution (pp. 151-54)?
Since the questions are raised at the end, not the beginning, they are largely 
rhetorical.  The previous chapters suggest the answers.  Congress should be allowed to 
create and enforce remedies of what it perceives to be violations of the 14th amendment.  
The courts, especially the Supreme Court, should defer to those judgments.  That the 
Court has not deferred suggests to Judge Noonan that something other than law is at 
34
   Judge Noonan’s comment that the dissent could take comfort in the fact that “not all” of the precedents 
confirming the broad sweep of the Commerce Clause were overruled is puzzling.  As Judge Noonan surely 
knows, neither Lopez nor Morrison overruled any of the Court’s prior Commerce Clause decisions.
9work.  Why does the Court treat Congress like an administrative agency?  Why does it 
continue to enforce sovereign immunity, which Noonan says “is a relic of the past 
without justification of any kind today” (p. 154)?  “[O]nly because the highest court has, 
by its own will, moved the middle ground and narrowed the nation’s power” (p. 156).
IV.
Judge Noonan’s conversational writing style and his use of dramatic narrative 
devices make Narrowing the Nation’s Power a good primer on what is certainly one of 
the drier topics in constitutional law.35  Unfortunately, it is a decidely one-sided primer.  
In this section, I will highlight problems with the three major portions of his argument: 
that Boerne was nothing more than a bid for judicial supremacy, that sovereign immunity 
is a fraud on the public that the Court keeps perpetuating, and that other decisions 
limiting congressional power, like Morrison, similarly contain the seeds of our Nation’s 
undoing.  In addition, I critique his proposed corrective to the Court’s doctrinal course 
and his implication that part of the cure involves judges (particularly appellate judges) 
paying more attention to the “human face” of the cases they decide.
A.
Had City of Boerne v. Flores come out the other way, Noonan suggests, the Court 
could not have led us down this road.  Congress should be permitted to “enforce” the 
14th Amendment, under its section 5 power, pretty much as it sees fit, with minimal 
interference from the courts.  After all, he notes several places, the Framers of the 14th 
Amendment left it to Congress, not to the Courts, to “enforce” the provisions of that 
Amendment (pp. 28, 148).  But his point proves too much: the Constitution arguably 
nowhere explicitly gives power to the Court to review any of Congress’s acts, whether 
passed under section 5 or under the provisions of Article I.  Nor is the Court explicitly 
given the power to enforce the provisions of the Bill of Rights.  That has not prevented 
the development and legitimization of judicial review.36  There does not appear to be any 
evidence that Congress, by reserving to itself the power to enforce the Amendment, 
intended to deprive the courts of the ability to interpret the Amendment and thus to 
define its content.37
35
   I write this as someone who has written extensively on the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, which 
tends to induce dormancy in my students when I teach it.
36 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
37 See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 97 (“Nothing is 
clearer about the history of the Fourteenth Amendment than that its framers rejected the option of an open-
ended grant of power to Congress to meddle with conditions within the states so as to render them equal in 
accordance with its own notions.  Rather the framers chose to write an amendment empowering Congress 
only to rectify inequalities put into effect by the states.  Hence the power of Congress comes into play only 
when the precondition of the denial of equal protection of the laws by a state has been met.  Congress’ view 
that the precondition has been met should be persuasive, but it cannot be decisive.”) [hereinafter Bickel, 
The Voting Rights Cases]; Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation 
Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 32-40 (1955); but see Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and 
Interpretation: A Critique of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 174-83 (1997) (disputing the 
Court’s interpretation of history, and conclusions drawn from that history).
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Judge Noonan elides the question with which the Court wrestled in Boerne: where 
does “enforcement” of the Amendment end, and the definition of the Amendment’s 
substantive content begin?  While the Court did suggest in Katzenbach v. Morgan that 
Congress could define the content independently and enforce that guarantee, there is 
history suggesting that language identical to the Necessary and Proper Clause was 
replaced in response to concerns that section 5 gave too much power over the states to 
Congress.38  Moreover, Brennan’s Morgan opinion is a bit ambiguous, because it offered 
an alternative ground for upholding § 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act: that Congress had 
concluded that non-English speaking Puerto Ricans were being discriminated against in 
the provision of public services, and needed to exercise the vote in order to elect 
administrators responsive to their needs.39
Even if the language of section 5 was intended to incorporate McCulloch’s 
standard for the Necessary and Proper Clause, there is nothing in McCulloch suggesting 
that courts refrain from reviewing exercises of congressional power.40  It was the Court, 
after all, not Congress, that proposed the standard of review.  Moreover, there is language 
in McCulloch (usually ignored by those invoking it) stressing the need for the end to be 
within the “letter and spirit” of the Constitution and warning against pretextual 
congressional power grabs.41  One might also argue, as the Boerne Court did, that 
permitting Congress to exercise its section 5 power to overturn a particular Supreme 
Court case and substitute its own interpretation of the Constitution is contrary to 
separation of powers principles, and undermines the rule announced in Marbury v. 
Madison.42  Noonan does not stop to consider the ramifications of permitting Congress to 
independently define the content of the 14th amendment’s provisions.  One wonders 
whether critics of Boerne would support congressional efforts to protect rights of gun 
owners against state and local gun control ordinances, on the theory that the right to keep 
and bear arms is a “liberty” protected by the 14th amendment that is being denied to 
millions around the country;43 or if Congress defined “persons” protected to include the 
unborn.44
38 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1966); supra note 37.
39 See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 652-53, 653-56.  Commentators have noted the ambiguity.  See, e.g., LUCAS A. 
POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 263 (2000); 1 TRIBE, supra note 14, at 937.
40 See Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, supra note 37, at 97-98.
41 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423 (“[S]hould Congress, under the pretext of executing its 
powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the government; it would become the 
painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to say, that such an act 
was not the law of the land.”).  Professor Lupu recognized this in his comment on Boerne.  Ira C. Lupu, 
Why the Congress Was Wrong and the Court Was Right—Reflections on City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 793, 816-17 (1998).
42 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535-36.  See, e.g., David P. Currie, RFRA, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 637 (1998).
43 See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning, Gun Shy: The Second Amendment as an “Underenforced Constitutional 
Norm,” 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 719 (1998) (describing thought experiment involving such a 
measure).
44 See, e.g., The Human Life Bill of 1981, S.158, 97th Cong. (1981).  Erwin Chemerinsky addresses this 
example in The Religious Freedom Restoration Act is a Constitutional Expansion of Rights, 39 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 601, 622-29 (1998).
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The point is not that Boerne is unassailable, or that the application of the 
proportionality and congruence tests by the Court in later cases is not open to criticism.  
But Judge Noonan writes as if no right-thinking person, much less a judge, could 
question his conclusions.  He suggests, moreover, that the Court departed from 
established understanding of Congress’s section 5 power when that “understanding” dates 
only from the mid-1960s, coming in a decision that has never been free from controversy.
B.
Of course, Boerne’s bite would not be as noticeable without the Court’s vigorous 
enforcement of sovereign immunity, the existence of which as a background 
constitutional principle, it argues, is signaled (but not coextensive with) the 11th
amendment’s text.45  There is much to criticize about the Court’s current approach to 
sovereign immunity.46  One may question the Seminole Tribe-Alden-College Savings 
Bank majority’s use of history.47  One may also question the efficacy of the majority’s 
use of structural arguments in these cases.48  One may question the Court’s continued 
fidelity to decisions like Hans v. Louisiana,49 in which the Court first held that sovereign 
immunity extended beyond the text of the 11th amendment.50  One can question the 
myriad exceptions that have arisen to prevent sovereign immunity from being a shield for 
state officials’ violations of constitutional rights.51  One may even criticize the unease 
with which state sovereign immunity rests alongside the popular sovereignty thought to 
undergird our system.52  Noonan (or his characters) make many of these criticisms.53  As 
with his critique of Boerne, however, the criticisms are either overdrawn, or fail to alert 
the reader to arguments made by noted scholars that support the Court’s position.
45 See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 728-29 (earlier cases “reflect a settled doctrinal understanding, consistent 
with the views of the leaving advocates of the Constitution’s ratification, that sovereign immunity derives 
not from the Eleventh Amendment but from the structure of the original Constitution itself.  The Eleventh 
Amendment confirmed, rather than established, sovereign immunity as a constitutional principle; . . . the 
scope of the States’ immunity from suit is demarcated not by the text of the Amendment alone but by the 
fundamental postulates implicit in the constitutional design”).
46
   The literature on sovereign immunity is now voluminous.  In addition to Carlos Vazquez’s helpful 
primer, see Vazquez, supra note 19, the issue receives extensive treatment in two recent symposia.  See
Symposium, Shifting the Balance?: The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Sovereign Immunity, 53 
STAN. L. REV. 1115 (2001); Symposium, State Sovereign Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment, 75 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 817 (2000).
47 See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 760-814 (Souter, J., dissenting); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 100-85 
(Souter, J., dissenting).
48 See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Alden v. Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure, 41 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1601 (2000). 
49 See, e.g., 134 U.S. 1 (1890).  For criticism of Hans, see, for example, Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 116-
30 (Souter, J., dissenting); Suzanna Sherry, The Eleventh Amendment and Stare Decisis: Overruling Hans 
v. Louisiana, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1260 (1990).
50 Hans,134 U.S. at 14-15.  
51 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 193-226 (discussing exceptions); 1 TRIBE, supra note 14, at 
534-35 (same). 
52 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1466 (1987) 
(characterizing sovereign immunity as “wholly antithetical to the Constitution’s organizing principle of 
popular sovereignty”).
53 See supra Part I.B.
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For example, Noonan repeatedly charges that the present sovereign immunity 
doctrine is largely a function of the evolution (or, Noonan would say, “a corruption” [p. 
84]) of judicial doctrine.  “The new constitutional decisions,” he writes, “do not depend 
on any words in the constitution.  They are boldly innovative.  It was once asserted by 
some members of the present court that decisions were wrong if they were unfaithful to 
the text of the constitution or lacked fidelity to the original intent of its framers.  These 
criteria are no longer used by these members who form part of the majority of the present 
court and denounce ‘ahistorical literalism’ in reading a constitutional provision” (p. 9).  
“The results I criticize were reached largely . . . by means of doctrinal devices that have 
no footing in the constitution,” he writes elsewhere (p. 12).  One of his characters refers 
to immunity as “an invention by the Supreme Court by which it exercises supreme power 
over the system” (p. 60); another refers to Hans as the means by which the Court is able 
to “conjure with . . . its own judicially created immunity for the states” (p. 74).  
As Judge Noonan surely knows, however, much of American constitutional law is
doctrine, or the result of doctrinal evolution.54  And it is not just the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity that is (arguably) court-created, and for which little evidence can be found in 
the text of the Constitution itself.  As Richard Fallon55 and David Strauss56 have pointed 
out, doctrine is the mechanism by which the Court implements the Constitution, applying 
its provisions to concrete cases, and furnishing guideposts for future application by other 
courts.57  Would Noonan discard the First Amendment’s “content” test,58 the Fourth 
Amendment’s exclusionary rule,59 the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine,60 the two-
54
   David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 877 (1996) (“In 
fact, in the day-to-day practice of constitutional interpretation, in the courts and in public discourse, the 
specific words of the text play at most a small role, compared to the evolving understandings of what the 
Constitution requires.”).  To acknowledge this is not to endorse this state of affairs.  Elsewhere I have 
suggested that too much focus on the work product of the Supreme Court is not a state of affairs to be 
desired, and have suggested enlarging the “canon” of materials that constitute the corpus of constitutional 
law.  See Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Constitutional “Incidents”: Interpretation in Real 
Time, 70 TENN. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2003).
55 RICHARD H. FALLON, IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2000).
56 See Strauss, supra note 54, at 877.
57 See FALLON, supra note 55, at 5-6; see also Charles Fried, Constitutional Doctrine, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
1140, 1140 (1994).
58 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (declaring that “[c]ontent-based 
restrictions are presumptively invalid”); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 903 (locating content distinction 
in the “fear . . . that the government will target particular messages and attempt to control thoughts on a 
topic by regulating speech”) (footnote omitted); see also Geoffrey Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 
U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987) (discussing content-neutral/content-based distinction).
59 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
60 See, e.g., CHEMERSINKY, supra note 14, at 401 (“There is no constitutional provisions that declares that 
states may not burden interstate commerce.  Rather, the Supreme Court has inferred this from the grant of 
power to Congress in Article I, § 8, to regulate commerce among the states.”); Henry P. Monaghan, The 
Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17 (1975) (“To 
my mind, the most satisfactory explanation of the commerce clause cases is that the Supreme Court is 
fashioning federal common law on the authority of the commerce clause.  That clause embodies a national, 
free-trade philosophy which can be read as requiring the Court, in limited circumstances, to displace state-
created barriers.”).  For an analysis of a possible textual hook for the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, 
see Brannon P. Denning, Justice Thomas, the Import-Export Clause, and Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. 
Harrison, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 155 (1998).
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tiered structure of review from Carolene Products,61 or even judicial review itself62
because their authority is derived largely from judicial doctrine?  If not, then it seems he 
should explain what it is about this particular doctrine that makes it especially pernicious, 
other than that it produces results with which he disagrees.
Related to his criticism of the doctrinal basis for sovereign immunity is Noonan’s 
argument that the presence of so many exceptions to the doctrine renders it illogical and, 
thus, “barely a principle” at all (p. 10).  But what would Judge Noonan say about, for 
example, the Establishment Clause?63  The Court’s Fourth Amendment cases?64  State 
action doctrine?65  To note that judicially-developed doctrine, articulated across time 
contains contradictions and tensions is not, I think, a successful indictment of the 
constitutional principles that courts attempt to implement.  With sovereign immunity, 
moreover, the contradictions and exceptions to which Noonan so vigorously objects serve 
the purpose of preventing state officials’ violations of constitutional rights with 
impunity—a result of which Noonan should approve.  The elimination of the Ex Parte 
Young exception might make the Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence more 
consistent, less contradictory, but would Judge Noonan really applaud such 
harmonization of doctrine by the Court?
His condemnation of the structural reasoning employed by the Court to explain 
the origins of their sovereign immunity principle is similarly overdrawn.  Criticizing the 
Court’s Seminole Tribe decision, “Yalewoman,” one of the clerks for “Judge Simple” 
exclaims:
The court may have written magisterially . . . but it spoke mysteriously.  What is a 
“constitutional plan” that is not expressed in the constitution? What is a 
“background principle” that does not make it into the foreground?  What is a 
“presupposition” that isn’t put into words?  I thought that modern justices, or at 
least some of them, were attached to the text of the document they were 
expounding.  If you don’t have a stable text, what do you have?  It makes the 
constitution so open to interpretation that, as the old Southern expression goes, 
you could drive a team of mules through it (p. 57).
One may say similar things about any Court decision that employs structural reasoning.  
Marshall’s McCulloch opinion,66 rightly praised as the very model of structural 
61 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).  This shift towards vigorous 
protection of individual liberties, which Judge Noonan celebrates, see pp. 15-23, is itself “judge-made.”
62
   Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing doctrine of judicial review despite lack 
of explicit textual authority).
63 See, e.g., See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at § 12.2.6.2 (describing confusion resulting from 
Court’s cases regarding public aid to parochial elementary and secondary schools); id. at 1194 (noting that 
the Court’s “rulings can be attacked as drawing a series of distinctions that appear to be arbitrary”).
64 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 757-58 
(1994) (terming current state of Fourth Amendment doctrine an “embarrassment”; describing exceptions 
and qualifications imposed by judicial decisions).
65 See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term—Foreword: “State Action,” Equal 
Protection, and California’s Proposition 14, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 69, 95 (1967) (concluding that state action 
doctrine is a “conceptual disaster area”).
66
   McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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reasoning,67 was criticized at the time for similarly relying on background first principles 
that many felt found no expression in the Constitution’s text.68  His interpretation of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause,69 moreover, was thought similarly to “destabilize” the text 
at the time.70  Structural opinions reaching nationalist ends—McCulloch, the Term Limits
decision,71 some dormant Commerce Clause doctrine cases72—or those that protect civil 
liberties, like Griswold,73 are as vulnerable as the sovereign immunity decisions and 
others, like Printz,74 that endorse non-nationalist results.
Like any other mode of interpretation, structural analysis can be done well or 
done poorly.75  Ernest Young has argued that the Court used structural analysis poorly in 
the sovereign immunity decisions.76  However, Noonan’s critique—inasmuch as it seems 
to reject structural analysis in toto—is either too broad (if he is rejecting all of structural 
analysis) or incomplete.  If he is not rejecting structural analysis completely, then he 
ought to explain what, precisely, it is about these sovereign immunity decisions that 
renders the Court’s resort to structural analysis particularly objectionable.
Judge Noonan might respond that structural reasoning, doctrinal elaboration of 
constitutional principle, and even tensions within doctrine itself are not per se
objectionable, but are deserving of particular condemnation in the Court’s sovereign 
immunity cases because there is no historical basis for the principle the Court has 
undertaken to vigorously enforce.77  One of Judge Simple’s grad school classmates, upon 
reviewing the history of the 11th amendment, exclaims “[t]here’s nothing to support the 
view that immunity was part of the constitutional design or inherent in its plan” (p. 85).  
The problem with this statement is that it contradicts statements made earlier in the 
chapter that the Court in Hans had claimed that history and original intent required it to 
enforce the background principle of sovereign immunity, even beyond the express 
wording of the 11th amendment (p. 80), and offered quotations from Hamilton, Madison, 
67 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 27 (1990) 
(describing McCulloch as a “magnificent example of reasoning from the text and structure of the 
Constitution”).
68 See, e.g., Mark R. Killenbeck, Pursuing the Great Experiment: Reserved Powers in a Post-Ratification, 
Compound Republic, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 117-25 (discussing the debate over power of Congress to 
incorporate a national bank).
69
   U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
70
   Criticisms of McCulloch in the Virginia newspapers, and John Marshall’s responses are reprinted in 
JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND (Gerald Gunther, ed., 1969).
71
   U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
72 E.g., Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851); Brannon P. Denning, The Dormant 
Commerce Clause Doctrine and Constitutional Structure (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
73
   Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
74 See United States v. Printz, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
75
   Brannon P. Denning & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Comfortably Penumbral, 77 B. U. L. REV. 1089, 1120 
(1997) (“We do not mean to say that penumbral reasoning is always the answer, or that it always will be 
used properly or responsibly.”); Young, supra note 48, at 1664 (“Structural argument, like any other form 
of constitutional interpretation, can be done well or poorly.”).
76
   Young, supra note 48, at 1651-75.
77 See, e.g., p. 57 (clerk questions whether “the court’s history [regarding sovereign immunity], like its 
logic, is screwed up).
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and Marshall in support of its conclusion.78  To get around this fact, Judge Noonan has 
his impromptu seminar simply declare that Hans was so much law office history, and that 
the quotations from the Framers were either ripped out of context by Justice Bradley (p. 
80), or that the Framers themselves said things they did not believe to ensure the 
Constitution’s ratification.
The problem with Noonan’s account of the intent of the Framers on the question 
of sovereign immunity is the same as with his account of congressional enforcement 
power under the 14th amendment: he adopts a particular historical view without even 
mentioning works of scholars whose views contradict his own.  David Currie79 and 
Lawrence Marshall,80 just to name two scholars, have suggested that the Court has gotten 
it exactly right.  Currie has defended Hans and writes that those who read the 11th
amendment as merely a jurisdictional provision are engaged in wishful thinking.81  Yet 
none of this is mentioned in the conversations among Noonan’s characters or is cited in 
the notes accompanying the book.  This omission is particularly troubling given the 
serious nature of the charges Noonan levels at the Court.  If reasonable people can look at 
the same evidence and arrive at different conclusions regarding sovereign immunity, is it 
really fair to then characterize the Court’s cases in this area as no more than an exercise 
of will by the majority?  Or consider his implicit argument that by affirming Hans’s 
approach to sovereign immunity, the Court is complicit in the Hans Court’s contribution 
to the federal government’s abandonment of Reconstruction in its bid for reconciliation 
with the South (pp. 79, 84-85).  While the disputes over whose history is more accurate 
may make us wary of its regular use, and more willing to hew closely to text and 
structure, it does not prove Noonan’s argument, which is that sovereign immunity is a 
fraud that a majority of the Court has continued to perpetrate on the country.
C.
Judge Noonan’s critique of the Court’s Commerce Clause decisions is even less 
persuasive.  While he implicitly criticizes the majority’s distinction between commercial 
and noncommercial activity, as well as its rejection of any interpretation of the Clause 
that rendered it essentially limitless (pp. 127-28, 133-34), Noonan does not propose any 
alternative—other than to hint that the Commerce Clause ought to have no judicially-
enforceable limits.82  If Noonan doesn’t advocate complete judicial withdrawal from 
policing the boundaries of congressional power, he at least indicates that once Congress 
has passed some sort of findings that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce, the 
Court should defer to that finding (pp. 131-33), which is scarcely different than saying 
78 See Hans, 134 U.S. at 12-15.
79 DAVID P. CURRIE: THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST ERA, 1789-1801, at 195-98 
(1997); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888-
1986, at 7-9 (1990). 
80
   Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342 
(1989); see also William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A Critical 
Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372 (1989).
81 CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS, supra note 79, at 197.
82 See pp. 133-34 (referring to the Court’s “misguided and ineffectual attempts” to “create categorical 
enclaves exempt from the commerce power”).
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that limits on Article I power are not judicially enforceable.  Considering Judge Noonan’s 
earlier argument that the framers of the 14th amendment intended Congress, not the 
courts, to enforce it, one might have expected to see a similar argument that the framers 
of the Constitution intended, through the Commerce Clause, to grant Congress near-
plenary power.  
The closest he comes to articulating his position is a quotation from Gibbons v. 
Ogden,83 in which Marshall refers to the commerce power as having “no limitations, 
other than are prescribed in the constitution” (p. 133).  Noonan chooses to read this as 
supporting the notion that “the commerce power of Congress [was] ‘plenary’” and that it 
had “not been restricted to a category” (p. 133).  But Marshall’s statement is largely a 
truism: Saying that Congress’s power, to the extent it possesses it, is plenary, means only 
that, for example, in deciding what powers are “reserved” to the States under the 10th
amendment, you have to first decide what powers Congress is assigned by Article I, aided 
by powers implied though the operation of the Necessary and Proper Clause.  But the 
quoted phrase also refers to those limits “prescribed in the constitution.”  As Marshall 
also noted in Gibbons, the enumeration of powers in Article I presumes something not
enumerated.84  John Marshall may have been a nationalist, but he was hardly a New 
Dealer.85  Here Noonan seems perilously close to replicating the law office history that he 
condemned in Bradley’s Hans opinion.86  And if precedent occasionally reinforced the 
view that there were no limits to Congress’s power (p. 133-34) why could that not be 
regarded as the same sort of “corruption of doctrine” that Noonan feels taints the 
Supreme Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence (p. 84)?87
D.
Judge Noonan also presents little evidence that the restrictions on Congress’s 
power under the 14th amendment, and the Court’s expansion of sovereign immunity, have 
rendered Congress prostrate at the feet of a mighty federal judiciary, producing 
irreparable harm to the Nation as a whole.  He writes of the “present damage,” the 
“present danger to the exercise of democratic government,” and of “much mischief” 
being done until the Court can be made to change and gravely prophecies “ (p. 140).  The 
decisions of the Court “fail to carry out purposes set out by the constitution itself” (p. 
83
   22 U.S. 1 (1823).
84
   Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824).
85 See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Book Review, 75 VA. L. REV. 1429, 1447-48 (1989) (reviewing G. 
EDWARD WHITE, III-IV THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 1815-1835 (1988)).
86 See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
87 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Is the Rehnquist Court an “Activist” Court?: The Commerce Clause Cases, 
73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1275 (2002) (suggesting that Lopez and Morrison were a necessary corrective to prior 
cases suggesting no limits on power of Congress under the Commerce Clause).  An additional problem 
with calls for deference to legislative judgments regarding the scope of their power is that the logic could 
be extended to restrict judicial enforcement of the Bill of Rights.  To those who would argue that the Bill of 
Rights are explicit limits on legislative power, I would respond that the enumeration of powers in Article I, 
like other structural features of the Constitution, were likewise seen as a safeguard against legislative 
overreaching.
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143) and cannot “be squared with the announced purposes of our constitution” (p. 12).  In 
his prologue, he asks:
Do decisions that return the country to a pre-Civil War understanding of the 
nation establish a more perfect union?  Are decisions just that shield not only the 
states but lesser appendages of the states from paying for the wrongs they 
commit?  Do decisions that leave the elderly and the disabled with inadequate 
remedies for unequal treatment establish justice?  Do decisions that dislodge 
patents, copyrights, and trademarks from assured protection insure domestic 
tranquility?  Do decisions that deny Congress the power to protect the free 
exercise of religion secure the blessings of liberty?  Do decisions that leave 
women less protected than men achieve any of the constitution’s ends (p. 12).
As is apparent from the structure of this remarkable paragraph, the source for Judge 
Noonan’s constitutional purposes is the Preamble, and his own sense of “justice,” which 
is nowhere further defined in the book.
His characterizations of the cases he discusses, and their ramifications are, to say 
the least, tendentious.  Which of the Court’s decisions have sought to reestablish 
antebellum constitutional principles?  The Court’s expansion of its sovereign immunity 
jurisprudence in Hans, dates from 1890.  Do decisions like Garrett and Kimel really
leave citizens without any remedy?  Congress could, as Noonan later suggests, attempt to 
compile a record to justify legislation under section 5.88  Moreover, to get around 
sovereign immunity, the United States could sue the states directly.89  Even with 
sovereign immunity in place, though, plaintiffs can seek an injunction,90 or sue state 
officials whose actions violate their rights.91  He barely mentions that both the Commerce 
Clause and the Spending Clause remain potent sources of congressional power.  
Moreover, one may quibble with Judge Noonan’s assumption that “adequate” 
remedies have to be federal remedies.  Many states have antidiscrimination statutes that, 
in some cases, are broader than those passed by Congress.92  And the charge that 
Morrison left men more protected than women simply does not wash.  Whatever the 
failings of Virginia Tech in punishing Christy Brzonkala’s attackers, there is no evidence 
that state tort remedies were so inadequate as to require a federal remedy to see justice 
done.  As for the judicial restrictions on congressional power to “secure the blessings of 
liberty” by “protecting the free exercise of religion,” one might as easily characterized 
Boerne as having protected the integrity of the Article V amendment process by 
preventing transient congressional majorities from altering substantive constitutional 
88 See infra Part I.A.
89 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 193; 1 TRIBE, supra note 14, at 527.
90 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 199; 1 TRIBE, supra note 14, at 534-35.
91 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 199-200; 1 TRIBE, supra note 14, at 534-35.  It is a symptom 
of the book’s argumentative, as opposed to analytical tone, that Noonan nowhere explains how careful 
pleading can assist plaintiffs wishing to avoid the traps posed by sovereign immunity.  Compare 1 TRIBE, 
supra note 14, at 534-36.
92 See, e.g., Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368 n.5, 374 n.9; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91 n.1, 92.  One other possible result 
from the Court’s decisions is that citizens will demand their states abolish or limit sovereign immunity. See, 
e.g., ILL. CONST. OF 1970, art. XIII, § 4 (abolishing sovereign immunity “[e]xcept as the General Assembly 
may provide by law”).
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rights by majority vote.  Nevertheless, Noonan writes as if the harm is self-evident, if 
only because the limitations on the powers of Congress resulted in individuals—many of 
whom are sympathetic—losing in court.  This brings me to the final aspect of Judge 
Noonan’s indictment that deserves comment.
E.
Judge Noonan devotes a large portion of his book to describing the facts of the 
various cases that he criticizes—at least as much (if not more) attention is paid to 
personalities than to the legal analysis of the cases.93  One gets the sense, especially 
during his description of the facts in Morrison (pp. 120-26) that he faults the courts, 
particularly the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court, for not devoting much attention 
to the parties, focusing instead on the legal niceties of the cases. “Almost complete 
indifference to the individual plaintiffs has been accompanied in [the Supreme Court’s] 
cases by an absence of interest in the number of persons negatively affected by the 
court’s rulings” (p. 145). Facts, he writes in the conclusion, “should drive cases,” not 
abstract rules (p. 144).  “At the center of facts are the persons who brought the facts into 
existence or responded to them.  Forget the facts, and you forget the persons helped or 
hurt by the decision” (p. 144).  To put it another way: “Let me state the facts, experienced 
counsel might say, the law will follow” (p. 144).  And Judge Noonan labors mightily to 
keep the facts—by which he means “persons negatively affected by the court’s 
rulings”—before the reader.
But does he really mean to criticize courts (especially lower courts) for not 
deciding cases according to the amount of sympathy that the litigants are able to elicit 
from the bench?  Such individualized adjudication seems to be, at best, in tension with 
rule of law values like neutrality, consistency, and predictability.  At worst it utterly 
subverts them.  Such critiques play to the simplistic urges of editorial page editors who 
have recently taken to opposing judicial nominees because their rulings evidence 
“insensitivity” to particular classes of plaintiffs, because they rule against them or in 
favor of corporate defendants on the basis of legal “technicalities.”94  Such criticisms 
display an astounding indifference to the underlying merits of judges’ rulings, focusing 
instead on a judge’s “box score” in favor of women, civil rights litigants, corporations, 
law enforcement, and the like.  It is amazing that a sitting judge and former academic 
would give aid and comfort to those employing such uninformed assessments.  If partisan 
politics has not already rendered the judicial appointments process positively radioactive 
in its toxicity, then the continuation of these critiques that Judge Noonan seems to 
endorse would certainly contribute further to the complete breakdown of the process.
93 Cf. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW (1976).  I thank my colleague Pat Kelley 
for pointing out that this is a long-running theme in Judge Noonan’s writings.
94 See, e.g., Stephen B. Presser, Time to Bury Borking, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 8, 2002, at 11 (offering examples 
and criticizing the trend); Jesse J. Holland, Senate Approves Owen’s Nomination to Appeals Court, WASH. 
POST, March 27, 2003 (quoting Sen. Ted Kennedy as opposing Texas Supreme Court Justice Pricilla 
Owen’s nomination to a federal appeals court seat because “It continues to be clear that Justice Owen is 
one of the most frequent dissenters . . . in cases involving workers, consumers, and victims of 
discrimination”).
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V.
And what should be done to a Court so obviously out of touch with the values of 
the Constitution, so intent on arrogating power to itself at the expense of Congress, so 
indifferent to the plight of real people who have to live with the consequences of the 
Court’s willful decisions?  Noonan’s answer is . . . not much.  Perhaps the most 
surprising aspect of Narrowing the Nation’s Power is how pusillanimous the “sovereign 
remedy” to the problem of the Rehnquist Court actually is.  After dismissing as too 
uncertain, cumbersome, or petty, a variety of weapons at Congress’s disposal—from 
amendment to limiting judges’ salaries95—he suggests that the best remedy “is legislation 
drafted after careful study of the opinions of the Supreme Court establishing the 
constitutional criteria and, if possible, using powers not constrained by the Court,” like 
Congress’s conditional spending power (p. 141).  
For someone whose just heaped scorn on the Court and its recent decisions, this 
strikes me as remarkably timid.  After criticizing the Court for usurping legislative 
prerogatives, Judge Noonan in the end counsels Congress to acquiesce to judicial 
supremacy, even though he thinks it unjust and harmful to the Nation.  Attempts to 
reclaim power, Noonan says will either be futile or “beneath the dignity of a national 
legislature.”    Moreover, since Noonan asserts that doctrines like sovereign immunity 
and the “proportionality and congruence” test of Boerne can mean whatever judges want 
them to mean in particular cases, careful drafting and close study of the Court’s cases are 
unlikely to furnish very effective guides for Congress.
While his reluctance to advocate drastic measures might be borne of a sense of 
judicial propriety, it is rather coy of him to restrain himself at the conclusion of his attack 
on the Court.  It could hardly be thought more disrespectful of the present Court to urge 
Congress to pass, and states to ratify, a constitutional amendment repealing the 11th
amendment or barring states from invoking sovereign immunity, than it is to accuse the 
Justices of fraud and usurpation of legislative power.  Moreover, if the course on which 
the present Court has embarked is indeed as harmful to the Nation as Judge Noonan 
suggests, and if he truly feels that judges and justices derogate from our national values to 
the extent that they enforce the Court’s erroneous decisions, then it seems incumbent 
upon the Senate to inquire into the view of nominees on this matter, and to reject those 
who do not provide satisfactory answer or assurances during the confirmation process.
On the other hand, it might be, as Judge Noonan testified before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, that both the error of the Court’s way in these decisions as well as 
the quantum of harm to the country resulting from those decisions, are matters over 
which reasonable people might disagree. If so, then the tentative nature of his sovereign 
remedy makes sense.  The Court will either be convinced of the error of its ways, or as a 
result of dialogue one of the justices will change her mind, or, perhaps, a new majority 
will form following the appointment of new personnel.  If one takes this view, then there 
is no need for Congress to begin resurrecting traditional court-bashing strategies like 
jurisdiction-stripping bills, Court-packing plans, or appointments embargoes.  But if this 
95 See supra Part III.
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is the reason for the pulling of punches that marks Judge Noonan’s conclusion, then one 
wonders why what came before—the excoriation of the cases and the none-too-subtle 
accusations that judicial will (as opposed to legal analysis and interpretation, sincerely 
applied) lay behind the decisions—was not similarly tempered with at least an 
acknowledgement that there were other sides to the issue and that right answers were not 
necessarily apparent?
VI.
While Judge Noonan’s book avoids some of the more inflammatory rhetoric that 
is characteristic of popular attacks on the Supreme Court,96 there is enough there that it 
blunts the palpable hits that he scores against the evolution and expansion of sovereign 
immunity as a principle of constitutional law.  Moreover, the good points he does make 
would have been strengthened had he acknowledged the other side of the position he 
embraces and not attempted to characterize the Court’s recent decisions as near-
fraudulent and mere exercises in judicial will.  While his engaging writing style and clear 
explanation of complicated subject matter are helpful as an introduction to the issues, his 
analysis, unfortunately, does little to advance either the debate over the Court’s approach 
to the 11th amendment and sovereign immunity or the renewed debate over the proper 
scope of judicial review in a 21st century democracy.97
96 See, e.g., VINCENT BUGLIOSI, NO ISLAND OF SANITY: PAULA JONES V. BILL CLINTON: THE SUPREME 
COURT ON TRIAL (1998); VINCENT BUGLIOSI, THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICA (2001); ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, 
SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED ELECTION 2000 (2001); MARTIN GARBUS, 
COURTING DISASTER: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE UNMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW (2002).  Of course, 
some of the works listed supra note 1, which railed against a liberal Supreme Court are similarly polemical 
and given to rhetorical excess.
97
   For a more thoughtful, evenhanded critique, see Mark R. Killenbeck, The Physics of Federalism, 51 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 1 (2002).
